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Tattinger v. Allbev: Has the London High 
Court Popped Its Cork? 
Following interlocutory relief,l the Chancery Division of the Lon-
don High Court recently handed down a decision in an unfair 
competition case that is likely to have serious repercussions in the 
United Kingdom and the European Community (EC).2 The case 
involved a misrepresentation ("passing off") dispute between Tattin-
ger, a well-known French champagne house3 and Allbev, an English 
beverage wholesaler.4 The originator and producer of the alleged 
infringing product called "Elderflower Champagne," Thorncroft 
Vineyards, also was named as a co-defendant.5 Tattinger claimed that 
Allbev was passing off its elderflower champagne as true cham-
pagne, and that the designation "champagne" was the exclusive 
property of the French champagne houses.6 Finding that the bal-
ance of convenience was on the side of the plaintiffs, the Chancery 
Court issued an injunction pending triaP 
1 Tattinger and Another v. Allbev Limited, [1992] F.S.R. 647 (Ch. Apr. 15, 1992) [hereinafter 
Tattinger I]. 
2 Tattinger and Others v. Allbev Limited and Others, [1993] F.S.R. _ (Ch. Feb. 8, 1993), 
repurted in THE TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 1993, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Alleur 
File [hereinafter Tattinger II]. 
3 Tattinger is a famous producer of French champagne that exports much of its product to 
England. Id. Joining in Tattinger's plea were two French trade groups, the Comire Interpro-
fessionnell du Vin de Champagne (CIVC) and the Institut National des Appellations d'Orig-
ine (INAO). CIVC is a French corporation formed to defend the interests of producers of 
wines sold under the appellation d'arigine champagne with the power to sue and be sued. 
INAO regulates the production of wines entitled under French law to use the appellations 
d'origine and also has the power to sue to defend the appellations. Id. As the literal translation 
suggests, the appellation d'origine or name of origin refers to a system used in France to 
register and legally control the labelling of wines. Only a wine produced from grapes grown 
in specified regions may use the name of the region, hence the familiar French phrase on 
imported wine labels: appellation contr6ltee. 
4 Allbev Limited is a producer and wholesaler of traditional non-alcoholic fruit drinks, 
alcoholic wines, and cordials organized under the laws of England. Id. 
5 Thorncroft Vineyards is an English partnership marketing, distributing, and wholesaling 
Allbev's products, including a product it developed and sold to Allbev called "Elderflower 
Champagne." Id. 
6 Tattinger I, supra note 1, at 652. 
7Id. at 657-58. The balance of convenience in granting an injunction relates to the calculus 
of harms between the plaintiff and defendant. Id. at 650 (citing American Cynamid Co. v. 
139 
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Surprisingly, at the trial, the court rejected the passing off claim. 
As one waggish journalist put it, the case pitted the "royalty versus 
the rabble" and "[t]he rabble won."8 In its previous English cases,9 
the French champagne industry consistently had succeeded against 
competitors mislabeling alcoholic beverages,1O but Allbev's elder-
flower champagne is a non-alcoholic drink made from flowers.ll The 
court held that although elderflower champagne was a misrepresen-
tation calculated to deceive, its impact on the reputation of genuine 
French champagne would be minimal. 12 In so ruling, the court 
denied the plaintiffs common law claim in a thorough opinion, but 
gave short shrift to the plaintiffs second claim of a violation of EC 
regulations. 
This Comment suggests that Tattinger v. Allbev was decided 
wrongly on English common law grounds13 and inevitably invites 
suspicion that a sub rosa political agenda was at work. Part I com-
mences with a review of the facts of the dispute and the prior judicial 
proceedings. Part II presents the reasoning used in the decision. 
Part III analyzes in detail the plaintiffs grounds for relief and where 
the court erred in applying both precedent and public policy con-
siderations. This Comment concludes that the decision is an unnec-
essarily narrow interpretation of English common law and a poten-
tially serious disruptive force in English commerce. The teaching of 
Tattinger v. Allbev also comes at a most inopportune time as the EC 
strives to accomplish the delicate task of abolishing barriers to trade 
Ethicon Ltd, [1975] A.C. 396). The American Cynamid rule allows granting of injunctions 
where damages would not provide the plaintiff with an adequate remedy for the harm done 
between the filing of the claim and the outcome of the trial. ld. at 650-51. 
8 Erik Ipsen, A Court's Pop at Bubbly u.K. Drink Can Be Champagne?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., 
Feb. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AHeur File. The impact of the decision 
apparently was not lost on the French either. France Soir, a leading daily, ran a photo with 
the caption, "[t]he ashes of St. Joan of Arc are shaking, Napoleon is turning in his grave." 
Quotes of the Day, CHI. ThIB., Feb. 9, 1993, (News), at 2. 
9 See, e.g., J. Bollinger v. The Costa Brava Wine Co., [1961] 1 All E.R. 561 (Ch.D); Vine 
Products v. MacKenzie & Co., [1969] R.P.C. 1 (Ch.);John Walker & Sons Ltd v. Henry Ost & 
Co., [1970] 2 All E.R. 106 (Ch.). 
10 The French had won 64 previous court battles in England and more than 20 in Spain, 
Australia, and the United States preventing wine makers from using the word "champagne" 
on the labels of products not from the Champagne region of France. John Hurst, UK.- Surrey 
Champagne Wins Court Case For French Title, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REv., Feb. 10, 1993, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Alleur File. 
II Ipsen, supra note 8; see also note 32 infra. 
12 ld.; Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 13. 
13 See generally W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE 
MARKS AND ALLIED RiGHTS Ch. 16 (2d ed. 1989). 
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within the community of Member States without invoking the sort 
of provincialism and nationalism that has bedeviled the national 
debates over the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty.14 
I. DOUBLE TROUBLE, BOIL AND BUBBLEI5 
The dispute arose in early 1991 when Tattinger's representatives 
in the United Kingdom became aware of Allbev's launch of 
"Elderflower Champagne."16 Two factors suggested that the product 
was passing itself off as true champagne and potentially deceiving 
the consuming public. First, the beverage was packaged in a seventy-
five centiliter bottle, shaped almost identically to a standard cham-
pagne bottle. 17 The bottle also used a mushroom-shaped cork se-
cured with a wire cage, although not with the foil wrapper, strongly 
resembling the closure system typically used for champagne bot-
tles. 18 Second, the bottle's label displayed the words "Thorn croft" 
and "Elderflower" in large letters, with "Champagne" appearing 
beneath in smaller letters. 19 The words "The Natural Non-Alcoholic 
Sparkling Refreshment" appeared below this, in even smaller let-
ters.20 The reverse label stated that the beverage was a "delightfully 
refreshing traditional drink" and listed the ingredients.21 Based on 
the striking resemblance to true champagne packaging and the 
appearance of the word champagne on the label, Tattinger ap-
proached both the English Wine Standards Board and the defen-
14Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter 
Maastricht Treaty]. Rising unemployment and a downturn in economic growth have been 
blamed for Danish voters' recent rejection of economic liberalism as represented by the 
Maastricht Treaty. See The European Community; A Ruugh Year, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1992, at 19. 
15With apologies for misquotation to the Bard. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MAcBETH act III, 
se. 2. The correction quotation is: Double, double toil and trouble/Fire burn and cauldron 
bubble. 
16 Tattinger I, supra note 1, at 651. Thorncroft's original product was Elderflower cordial, 
which it first marketed in 1984. Id. at 649. Sales literature for the cordial included recipes 
based on additives to the cordial, including "lemonade" (cordial with water added) and 
"champagne" (cordial with sparkling mineral water added). Id. In 1989, Thorncroft decided 
to market the "champagne" version premixed and bottled, and launched the "Elderflower 
Champagne" beverage in October 1991. Id. The product received a favorable review in the 
trade press and sales for a three-month period between November 1991 and January 1992 
totaled 1,700 cases of the 75 centiliter bottle styled in the manner of true champagne. Id. at 
649-50. 
17Id. at 650,656. 
18Id. 
19Id. at 650. 
20 Tattinger I, supra note 1, at 651. 
21Id. 
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dant to alter the label, but its efforts were rebuffed.22 Consequently, 
Tattinger and the French trade groups filed a motion for interlocu-
tory relief in the London High Court, Chancery Division on Febru-
ary 17, 1992. Their claim was based on the common law tort of 
passing off and a violation of EC regulations.23 
The Chancery Court granted interlocutory relief, holding that a 
serious issue existed regarding dilution of Tattinger's protected 
trade name and damage to their reputation and goodwill based on 
common law.24 The court observed that (1) deception, that is, a 
successful misrepresentation, was not essential to a successful pass-
ing off action but (2) that the plaintiff's claim on the basis of EC 
Regulations was "tenuous. "25 Thus, the Chancery Division granted 
an injunction on April 15, 1992, requested findings to determine 
the cost of requiring Allbev to place new labels on its bottles, and 
directed that a speedy trial take place to determine the passing off 
claim.26 
II. ALLBEV COMES Up SMELLING OF ROSES (OR AT LEAST 
ELDERBERRIES) 
At the trial for passing off and unfair competition, the plaintiffs 
claimed that Allbev should be enjoined from utilizing the word 
champagne on their labels. They claimed the designation was "dis-
tinctive exclusively" of a wine produced in the Champagne Region 
of France and a valuable reputation and goodwill attached to their 
exclusive nomenclature.27 The plaintiffs argued that the issue was 
settled law and pointed to the English precedent which had estab-
lished that "Champagne" only can refer to products produced in 
22Id. at 65!. 
23Id. at 649. The plaintiff claimed relief under article 15(5) of the EC regulation 823/87, 
which provides that "[t]he following may be used for the description and presentation of a 
beverage other than a wine or grape must only if there is no risk of confusion as to the nature, 
origin or source and composition of such beverage ... a traditional specific term referred to 
in paragraph 2." Council Regulation 823/87, art 15(5), 1987 OJ. (L 84) 65. The word 
"Champagne" is included in paragraph 2. Id. art. 15(2). The regulation basically prohibits 
the use of specified designations pre-dating the EC, where such unauthorized uses by second-
comers could lead to public confusion. 
24Tattinger I, supra note 1, at 656. The major precedent for passing off actions involving 
champagne is the seminal case of]. Bollinger v. The Costa Brava Wine Co., [1961] 1 All E.R 
561 (Ch.D). In that case, the court held that only wines from the Champagne region of France 
could be sold in England using the designation "champagne." Id. at 564. 
25 Tattinger I, supra note 1, at 656. 
26Id. at 657. 
27 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 3. 
1994] TATTINGER v. ALLBEv 143 
France.28 In their view, notwithstanding the precedents, calling a 
concoction of elderflowers "champagne" was a contradiction in 
terms29 and therefore violated even a commune reading of passing 
off law. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs produced compelling evidence that the 
product would confuse a significant segment of consumers, espe-
cially those who purchase champagne only rarely as a celebratory 
drink.30 They also argued the likelihood of confusion would be even 
greater, given that the packaging dress of the elderflower container, 
a champagne-shaped green glass bottle with a wired cork, was nearly 
identical to true champagne dress.31 Furthermore, the plaintiffs 
argued that the price and nonalcoholic nature did not distinguish 
the elderflower product sufficiently because other champagnes and 
sparkling wines sell in the £2-3 range, and nonalcoholic wines are 
common nowadays.32 
The defendants countered that the elderflower champagne labels 
would mislead no one because the labels clearly indicated that the 
product was nonalcoholic33 and produced in Great Britain.34 Addi-
tionally, "elderflower champagne" is but one of a number of tradi-
tional "hedgerow"35 beverages that have been known to the English 
28 Id. at 5; see]. Bollinger v. The Costa Brava Wine Co., [1961] 1 All E.R. at 564. 
29 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 4. The label of the product listed the ingredients as 
"carbonated Hampshire spring water, cane sugar, fresh elderflowers, lemons, citric acid." Id. 
Champagne, on the other hand, is produced by vintage grapes with naturally-<>ccurring 
carbonation as a result of fermentation. Tattinger's counsel, Nicholas Bragge, was quoted as 
saying that the fundamental issue involved was that using the words "elderflower champagne" 
on the label was untruthful, because it failed to describe the contents accurately. UK: Legal 
Battle Over ''Elderflower Champagne" Name Continues, Reuter Textline, Apr. 11, 1992, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis library, Alleur File [hereinafter Legal Battle]. 
30Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 5. The plaintiff's argument attempted to counter the 
common sense defense to consumer confusion that the buying public is sufficiently sophisti-
cated to distinguish between products with similar or even identical designations. Using this 
logic, no harm to the public or to the first user's goodwill or sales would occur. See]. Bollinger 
v. The Costa Brava Wine Co., [1961] 1 All E.R. at 566-68. 
31 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 5. 
32 !d. at 5~. Alcoholic wines based on apples, blueberries and other fruits are marketed 
commercially at present. 
33 Id. at 7. There was an allusion in an earlier passing off case that English courts might 
differentiate between grape-based beverages and those made from other fruits. See HP Bulmer 
Ltd v.]. Bollinger SA, [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, 1231 (C.A. 1974). Neither party in this case 
advanced the distinction, however, and the court's remarks thus must be interpreted as dicta. 
34 Id. at 6-7; see also Legal Battle, supra note 29. 
35 "Hedgerow" refers to common herbs and other flowers that grow uncultivated in the 
hedgerows of England. The court acknowledged by implication an English rural tradition of 
brewing potions and concoctions, in the manner of dandelion wine, from such plants. 
Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 10, 14. 
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public since the turn of the century. The defendants argued that 
their intention was not to tarnish or profit from the reputation of 
French champagnes, but to revive a healthy, nonalcoholic beverage 
with a long tradition in England,36 albeit not as a commercial prod-
uct but more like a home remedy. Defendants claimed they were 
aware of the potential for confusion37 and took extensive steps to 
prevent this problem by clearly labelling the product as nonalco-
holic and elderflower-based, as well as omitting the standard foil 
wrapper over the wire cage that appears on true champagne bot-
tles.38 
The Chancery Court relied on the teaching of Erven Warnink v. 
Townend & Sons in analyzing the legal requirements for proving 
a passing off action.39 In a widely-quoted passage, Lord Diplock 
defined the necessary elements for an unfair competition action by 
passing off as follows: 
(1) a misrepresentation (2) made by a trader in the course 
of trade (3) to prospective customers of his or ultimate 
consumers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which 
is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another 
trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a 
business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is 
brought or (in a quia timetw action) will probably do SO.41 
Under these guidelines, the court held that Allbev's use of the word 
champagne did constitute a misrepresentation, because the label 
36 [d. at 7. 
37 The interlocutory court paraphrased Allbev's summation of the efficacy of their precau-
tions as "not even a moron in a hurry" would confuse their product with champagne. Tattinger 
I, supra note 1, at 653. 
38 [d. 
39 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 8; Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. 927 
(H.L.). This case involved a passing off action by the producers of Advocaat, a well-known 
concoction of eggs and spirits, against interlopers selling egg flip, a concoction of eggs and 
sherry, under the same name. [d. Originally, English common law only recognized passing 
off, the wrong of a second trader representing his goods as those of the first trader using a 
particular name, symbol or the like. [d. at 929. The landmark case of]. Bollinger v. The Costa 
Brava Wine Co. extended the law of passing off to include actions against unfuir competition, 
by recognizing the value of a trader's property right in the goodwill associated with his name. 
[1961] 1 All E.R. at 563. 
40 Literally, because he fears or apprehends. A bill in equity filed by a party fearing a future 
probable harm to his rights or interests. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1247 (6th ed. 1990). 
41 Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 932-33; see also CORNISH, supra 
note 13, at 404. 
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declared that the contents of the bottle were champagne.42 The 
court also stated it had "no difficulty" in finding that elements (2) 
and (3), sales in the course of trade to prospective customers, were 
satisfied.43 
The rub came, in the court's reasoning, whether the misrepresen-
tation was calculated to injure the goodwill or business of the cham-
pagne producers and did in fact cause, or was likely to cause, injury.44 
In determining whether the misrepresentation was "calculated to 
injure" the court applied the settled rule that intent to cause injury 
is not necessary in a passing off action.45 In this case, following this 
reasoning, the primary consideration was whether an actual, sub-
stantial injury would occur as a result of the misrepresentation.46 
Applying the facts of this case, the court considered whether 
the misrepresentation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence or 
would cause actual damage.47 The court admitted that a risk of 
confusion existed between the goods of the two parties, but deter-
mined that it was unrealistic to assume any likelihood of confusion 
between their businesses.48 The rule, as expressed in Erven Warnink 
v. Toumend & Sons, was whether the plaintiff "has suffered, or is 
really likely to suffer, substantial damage to his property in the good-
will by reason of the defendants selling goods which are falsely 
described by the trade name to which the goodwill is attached. "49 
Because no evidence as to substantial economic damage was avail-
able, or even realistic to expect,50 the question devolved to the effect 
42 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 10. This reasoning was entirely consistent with the holding 
in J Bollinger v. The Costa Brava Wine Co. [1961] 1 All E.R. at 563. In that case, the Chancery 
Court determined that the adjective "Spanish" modifying "Champagne" on the product's label 
made the "counterfeit not less but more calculated to deceive." Id. at 565. 
43 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 10. 
44 Id. at 13. 
45Id. at 10. 
46Id. at 13-14. 
47Id. at 12. 
48 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 13. The court surmised that only a small segment of the 
wine-buying public would purchase elderflower champagne thinking it was genuine cham-
pagne. Id. at 13-14. The court also found compelling the circumstance that Thorncroft's 
market share was currently very small and that their product was not directly competitive with 
genuine champagne. Id. at 13. 
49Id. (emphasis added) (citing Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 944 
(concurring speech of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton) ). It is significant that Judge Davies quoted 
from Lord Fraser's opinion rather than the leading opinion of Lord Diplock, as the latter's 
opinion did not utilize the concept of substantiality of damage in defining injury for passing 
off claims. 
50 Although not explicitly mentioned by the court, the relative disproportion in size and 
market reach of the plaintiff and defendant probably had some impact on the court's 
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on the plaintiffs reputation and goodwill.51 The interlocutory court 
had suggested a potential damages action based on dilution of 
the worldwide reputation of genuine champagne. 52 The Chancery 
Court, however, glossed over the dilution issue, determining that the 
effect on the plaintiffs reputation "will in my view be nil or mini-
mal. "53 The court found dispositive the fact that only a small section 
of the public would ever purchase elderflower champagne, and that 
there was no indication that Allbev intended to enlarge their opera-
tion. 54 
The court's reasoning suggested that the parties were not, and 
probably would not ever be, in serious competition with each other. 55 
Thus, actual damage became the crucial issue, because the court 
held that the law of passing off generally does not contemplate 
damage to another's business (lost sales) or goodwill (dilution or 
tarnishment), even where a calculated misrepresentation occurs, if 
the two parties are competing in widely divergent markets.56 
III. WHERE THE COURT'S REASONING FIZZLED 
The English common law of passing off protects the goodwill 
between a producer and the consuming public that the trademark 
reasoning. The Champagne Region of France produced more than 278 million bottles last 
year. James Langton, Focus The King of Wines, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 14, 1993, at 15. Allbev 
produced approximately 100,000 bottles of elderflower champagne. See infra text accompa-
nying note 80. Of course, reasonable persons might differ whether some fraction of £235,000 
(1992 sales at £2.35 per bottle, Tattinger I, supra note 1, at 653), is substantial to the French 
Champagne makers. The rebuttal to those who would find the damage insubstantial is that 
England is the largest export market for champagne in Europe. Hurst, supra note 10, at 12. 
Thus, allowing even a small measure of harm now is analogous to the very small crack in the 
dam that left unrepaired eventually releases a torrent. 
51 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
52 Tattinger I, supra note 1, at 655. 
53 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 13. 
54 [d. at 14. 
55 [d. at 13. 
56 [d. But see Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 932 (citing AG 
Spaulding & Bros v. AW Gamage Ltd, [1915] 32 R.P.C. 273 (H.L.), a case that extended the 
law of passing off to include unfair competition by misrepresenting inferior goods as those 
from a source of superior goods). See also CORNISH, supra note 13, at 421-22. Thus, "Cadillac 
Dog Food" cannot harm the sales of Cadillac automobiles directly. The tarnishment branch 
of passing off law, which provides a remedy for indirect damage done to goodwill and 
reputation, only extends the trademark holder's protection a limited degree, however, espe-
cially if a court is convinced that no consumers will be buffaloed into thinking that the two 
products are the same. See generally id. at 413-15, 416; see also Mead Data Central, Inc. v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989) (markets in which Lexis software 
and Lexus cars sold so divergent that no possibility of consumer confusion or tarnishment). 
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helps to maintain.57 The interest protected is no longer merely the 
trader's property in a distinctive name, but also the goodwill associ-
ated with the name.58 Contrary to the court's reasoning, however, 
the "substantial stake" referred to in Erven Warnink v. Townend & 
Sons relates more to the tarnishment and dilution of a distinctive 
mark such as champagne, than to any quantifiable economic in-
jury. 59 This reasoning is the basis for the legal principle that no 
showing of intent to damage is required in the law of passing off.60 
In addition, the settled grounds for passing off law stated by Lord 
Diplock in Erven Warnink v. Townend & Son1'1 also reflect this 
reasoning by requiring a "misrepresen tation ... which causes actual 
damage to the business or goodwill of the trader ... or will probably 
do so. "62 It is notable that Lord Diplock found no need to mention 
the extent of the damage or to modifY the concept with an adjective 
such as "substantial."63 Thus, it is curious that the court found it 
necessary-from a legal standpoint-to add the word substantial 
Lord Diplock had recognized the damage from passing off could 
consist merely of tarnishing the reputation,64 an injury which is 
inherently difficult to substantiate in quantifiable terms. It is equally 
interesting that the Chancery Court required such a high eviden-
tiary level for the probability of damage factor.65 
If the court had applied Lord Diplock's formulation of the law 
precisely, it would have been expressed as follows: 
(1) The labeling of the elderflower beverage as champagne was a 
misrepresentation; 
57 See CoRNISH, supra note 13, at 402. Because a trademark is merely symbolic and has no 
intrinsic value standing alone, the value of a trademark from a legal perspective depends on 
the goodwill associated with the trademark. Thus, a registered trademark never employed has 
no goodwill or commercial value, other than the cost of developing the concept and artwork. 
It follows then, that damages against a party infringing on a registered but unused trademark 
would be de minimis. [d. at 402. 
58 Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 935,937. 
59 CORNISH, supra note 13, at 42l. 
60 In other words, when a valid, recognized trade name is infringed, especially by use in a 
similar market niche, the law assumes damage to goodwill. This assumption should hold, 
whether that damage manifests itself as a tarnishment of the original party's goodwill or in 
quantifiable lost sales. See generally id. at 402. 
61 [1979] 2 All E.R. at 932-33. 
62 [d. (emphasis added). 
63 Notwithstanding that Lord Fraser of Tullybelton did use such language in his concurring 
speech. Compare Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 932-33 (leading 
opinion of Diplock, LJ.) with Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 943-44 
(concurring opinion of Fraser, LJ.). 
64 [d. at 937; see also CORNISH, supra note 13, at 417. 
65 See Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
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(2) that was made by Allbev in the course of trading by placing 
the bottles on store shelves; 
(3) thereby available to prospective customers of sparkling bever-
ages; 
(4) which was calculated or reasonably foreseeable to induce 
consumers to purchase the elderflower beverage in lieu of genuine 
champagne because of the similarity of packaging and labelling; 
(5) and which misrepresentation caused or would be likely to 
cause actual damage to Tattinger by decreasing and diverting sales 
(business damage) or tarnishing the reputation of champagne 
(damage to goodwill) in the minds of unsophisticated buyers who 
purchased the elderflower beverage thinking it was champagne and 
were disappointed. Notwithstanding the variety possible when inter-
preting a previous judge's "black letter" rule, common sense and 
practical knowledge of the commercial world certainly would seem 
to suggest a more realistic interpretation of the rights underlying 
Lord Diplock's formulation of the law. 
It may be realistic that few consumers seeking a healthy, nonalco-
holic beverage would purchase champagne instead of elderflower 
champagne. It even may be realistic that unsophisticated consumers 
infrequently seeking a celebratory beverage would not purchase 
elderflower champagne instead of true champagne, due to the price 
differential, label disclaimer, and minor packaging differences such 
as the lack of a foil wrapper. The evidence, however, showed that 
both products share the same shelf space and several sparkling wine 
producers now were marketing nonalcoholic versions.66 In addition, 
the distinction the court tacitly draws between the plaintiffs business 
(alcoholic beverages) and the defendant's business (health foods) 
is patently unrealistic. Modern day marketing and changing con-
sumer preferences have blurred this distinction, and the evidence 
substantiates the crossover marketing of such products.67 Thus, the 
exception granted from similar names used by enterprises in widely 
divergent lines of business simply is not appropriate here.68 
Moreover, it is clear that at least an occasional consumer will be 
deceived as to the source and contents of the elderflower product, 
given the almost universal public recognition of the name cham-
pagne, if not the precise taste and other distinguishing charac-
teristics. The court admits that the low price of "elderflower cham-
pagne" would be insufficient to dispel potential deception for a 
66 [d. at 5. 
67 See id. 
68 See supra note 56. 
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"simple unworldly man."69 The court's reliance on a lack of a sub-
stantial number of consumers being deceived, however, seems unre-
alistic and certainly time-bound.70 The court overlooked Lord 
Diplock's recognition that damage could arise from deception of 
"prospective customers or consumers" and that such damage merely 
must be actual, not necessarily substantial.71 Whether many, some, 
or any consumers will be duped into buying a product they did not 
desire originally is not the only consideration, however. 
More importantly, the reasoning of the court ignores the well-es-
tablished principle that consumer confusion is not the sole basis for 
a passing off action.72 The value being protected is the trading 
reputation of the producer, not merely the dollar value of diverted 
sales.73 Why should a trader have the legal right to label its product 
falsely, as Allbev admittedly did, and escape liability merely because 
a "substantial" segment of the public mayor may not be confused? 
In this case, the tarnishment or blurring of the venerable name 
champagne is the crucial issue, not public confusion or deception. 
As Lord Diplock pointed out, "a geographical limitation [implicit in 
the trade name] may make it easier ... to establish that the plain-
tiff's own business will suffer more than minimal damage to its 
goodwill by the defendant's misrepresenting his product as being of 
that type."74 
The appellation d'origine champagne used by more than fifteen 
thousand vintners in France is controlled closely through the legal 
enforcement powers granted to the Comite Interprofessionnell du 
Yin de Champagne (CIVC) and the Institut National des Appella-
tions d'Origine (INAO) by French law.75 Through numerous suc-
cessfullegal actions in Europe and on other continents, it has been 
well-established that these organizations and the individual vintners 
have a valuable property and goodwill that deserves protection. 76 
69 Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 12. 
70 In the first place, the parties certainly would differ as to what number of deceived 
consumers is significant Second, few persons would disagree that if a less than substantial 
number are deceived today, as Allbev's business grows, at some point the number of deceived 
consumers inevitably will become substantial by any manner of counting. 
71 Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 938. 
72 CORNISH, supra note 13, at 404. 
73 fd. 
74 Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 937. 
75 See supra note 3. 
76Tattinger II, supra note 2, at 3; see generally J. Bollinger v. The Costa Brava Wine Co., 
[1961] 1 All E.R. 561; Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. 927. The vigorous 
defense of their trade name in the past, as well as the immediate initiation of its action against 
Allbev, indicates that the French champagne houses believe they have a valuable asset to 
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Commercial enterprises and ultimately the legal systems of most 
countries have long recognized the injury arising from an assumed 
connection between the original trade name and a newcomer ap-
plying that name to a different product.77 The Chancery Court's 
whittling away of England's once strong stance against passing off is 
not only unfortunate for the French champagne houses, but also for 
other traders who have heretofore relied on English legal principles 
of unfair competition in a tumultuous marketplace.78 The decision 
only can lead to increased uncertainty and future shenanigans by 
unscrupulous traders testing the now muddied waters of English 
commerce.79 
The teaching of Tattinger v. Allbeu, as well as the similarly-decided 
case of Stringfellow v. McCain Foods (GB) Ltrl'° only can engender 
additional erosion of trade name holders' rights, if these cases are 
not limited to their facts or overruled. If not, the newly weakened 
law will have a serious impact on manufacturers whose products are 
counterfeited frequently. Many questions, once thought safely abed, 
inevitably will arise. Does English unfair competition law fail to 
protect well-known names from tarnishment by allowing their use 
in related commercial contexts? Must plaintiffs show not only spe-
cific numbers of deceived consumers, but furthermore substantial 
numbers of lost consumers or sales? If so, what is the de minimis 
threshold beyond which an action will lie? It appears after Tattinger 
v. Allbev that the answers to these questions are ''yes,'' ''yes'' and 
protect. Andre Evers, director of the CIVC, was quoted as saying: "We have spent three 
centuries and a lot of effort building up the reputation of champagne ... lilt is very important 
that should not lose its sparkle, for the consumers to know that the wine they buy for a special 
celebration is real champagne." Suzanne Lowry, Fizz, Bubbly and a Big Pop, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Feb. 12, 1993, at 13. The article reports that CIVC contests every passing off dispute and has 
approximately 100 case files open in 28 countries at present. Id. For example, recently, a New 
Zealand court enjoined an Australian wine maker from calling its product champagne. Id. 
77 See generally CoRNISH, supra note 13, at 10. 
78Id. 
79The court's decision appears myopic in only considering the damage to Tattinger. As 
Lord Diplock mentioned, the size of the class of traders entitled to protection of a trade name 
is significant. Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 936-37. 
80 Stringfellowv. McCain Foods (GB) Ltd, [1984] R.P.C. 501 (C.A.June 26,1984). This case 
involved a dispute between a nightclub and a producer of potato chips, both using the name 
Stringfellow. The nightclub had registered and used the name Stringfellow first. The court 
held that even if viewers of television commercials advertising the potato chips associated the 
product with the nightclub, the nightclub would suffer no "substantial damage." Id. at 25. 
The nightclub had advanced two theories of potential damage. Id. at 26. First, that persons 
would be less likely to choose the nightclub for special promotions. Second, that confusion 
based on the names might lessen the nightclub's future chances to exploit its name for 
merchandising. Applying the heightened "substantial damages" doctrine, see supra text ac-
companying notes 61-62, the court found neither injury likely or substantial. Id. at 29. 
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"depends," which places a much greater burden of proof on the 
plaintiff. 
In addition, the implicit loosening of the not-in-competition ex-
ception to passing of£81 threatens to swallow the rule. Street peddlers 
selling knock-off Rolex watches, for example, theoretically could 
escape passing off actions. They clearly are not marketing their 
goods in the same outlets as the manufacturer of genuine Rolexes; 
anyone should know that you cannot buy a $10,000 Rolex for $40; 
and no one will forego buying a genuine Rolex simply because they 
can buy a knock-off. As the hypothetical indicates, after Tattinger v. 
Allbev, decisions can turn all too easily on slight variations in facts, 
rather than a predictable rule of law. 
CONCLUSION: HAS THE BUBBLY GONE FLAT? 
The Chancery Court's decision is not one to dismiss lightly, as 
Allbev's elderflower champagne has become a best-seller, with over 
100,000 bottles sold in 1992.82 Beyond the real potential for substan-
tial damage to the producers of genuine champagne in terms oflost 
sales through consumer deception, the decision also ignores the 
significant likelihood that the goodwill built up over the centuries 
and associated with the name champagne will be tarnished or 
blurred. Reports in the press indicate that other non-French pro-
ducers of sparkling wines are considering whether to test the limits 
of the decision by importing products under similar names that 
previously had been barred.83 By chilling the law of unfair competi-
tion and passing off in England, the damage the decision may do 
to the orderliness of the English market probably will not be limited 
to champagne. 
The decision also inevitably suggests a sub rosa political agenda at 
work. Allbev's victory was hailed widely in England, which has been 
involved in several commercial disputes with France since France 
made objections to an EC-US bilateral trade agreement.84 The deci-
sion also comes at a time when Member States are already wary of 
the cessation of national autonomy, as the recent Danish rejection 
81 See Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 934; Stringfellow v. McCain 
Foods (GBl Ltd, [1984] R.P.C. 501, at 18. 
82Hurst, supra note 10. 
83 Since the ruling, several U.S. champagne makers are reported to be considering changing 
their labels, because they are currently prohibited from selling their products in Europe as 
"champagne." Lucy Howard & Gregory Cerio, Move Over, Dandelion Wine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 
22, 1993, at 8. 
84 Hurst, supra note 10. 
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of the Maastricht Treaty indicates.85 On this level, the decision can 
be interpreted as sending a message to the EC that its objectives of 
open borders and free movement of goods are not unlimited. By 
allowing the defendants to prevail because elderflower champagne 
is a "traditional" beverage that is unlikely to cause "substantial dam-
age" to the French Champagne Houses, it is difficult not to consider 
the case as a blatant example of protectionism.86 Mter the court's 
decision, Guy Woodall, co-owner of Thorncroft Vineyards, was 
quoted as saying that "the spirit of Agincourt lives on," referring 
to England's crushing defeat of the French armies in 1415.87 The 
French plaintiffs plan to appeal the decision and are investigating 
whether the practice violates EC laws.88 The outcome of the appeal 
could have more impact on the future of the EC than Agincourt 
ever had on Anglo-French relations. 
The case of Tattinger v. Allbev will not end with the Chancery 
Court's ruling. The French plaintiffs have insisted they will appeal 
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It is improbable, indeed 
almost unthinkable, that such an appeal will fai1.89 With earnings 
from sales of French champagne nearing £10 billion per year,90 it is 
unlikely that practical politics and EC economics will allow the ECJ 
to rule against the French.91 
Laurence P. Harrington 
85 See generally CORNISH, supra note 13. 
86 Significantly, England is the largest export market for French champagne. See Ipsen, supra 
note 8. 
87 [d. English journalists echoed Woodall's perspective. "[A]ctions like this are pathetic. 
We're not talking about a ... drink that a half-witted teetotaler would confuse with cham-
pagne ... what is likely to be truly damaging to Tattinger ... is the ridicule heaped upon 
them for this ill-conceived attempt to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut." Oz Clarke, Food 
and Drink; Too Many Grapes Spoil the Flavour, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 20, 1993, at 11. 
88 Ipsen, supra note 8. 
89 Commenting on the Chancery Court's decision, a senior European Commission official 
predicted that the the European Court of Justice (ECJ) "almost surely" would decide that 
Allbev and Thorncroft were violating EC law. French to Appeal Against Champagne Judgment, 
PRESS ASS'N NEWSFILE, Feb. 10, 1993, available in l.EXIS, Nexis Library, Alleur File; see also 
BorisJohnson & Tim Witcher, Cordial Threatens Entente, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 10, 1993, at 
2 (quoting EC agricultural officials who believe that elderflower champagne infringes on the 
appellations controllees). 
90 Langton, supra note 50, at 15. 
91 The procedural aspects of the appeal are somewhat unclear, however. In HP Bulmer Ltd 
v. J Bollinger SA, the court reasoned that only the House of Lords was required to refer 
questions ofEC law to the ECl [1974] 2 All E.R. at 1232-33. No lower English court was bound 
to do so. [d. at 1233. Thus, the EC] might require the plaintiffs to exhaust their appeals in 
England, by pleading to the House of Lords, before accepting the suit. 
